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LEAKS, GAGS AND SHIELDS: TAKING
RESPONSIBILITY
Gerald F. Uelmen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Discussions of the impact of publicity upon trials usually
begin with an analysis of rights. The defendant has a right to
a fair trial. The lawyer has a right to speak. The public has a
right to know. As Newton Minow suggests in his keynote address, however, the fact that we have a right to do something
does not mean it is the right thing to do. In exploring the
ethical dimensions of trial publicity, I would like to focus on
the concept of responsibility, rather than rights. How do we
get the participants in a trial to accept responsibility for what
they say to the media? How do we get the media to accept
responsibility for what they report? My experience in high
profile trials suggests that much of what the participants say
and the media report is simply irresponsible. They act irresponsibly because the system frequently rewards their irresponsibility with high ratings or increased circulation, and
rarely imposes costs or consequences upon it.
The ideal of fairness that drives our adversary system of
justice assumes that a verdict must be based upon evidence
that is admissible in a court of law. 1 The facts should be de* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor
Uelmen served as co-counsel for the defense in the case of People v.O.J. Simpson. He would like to thank Louis Parise, Santa Clara Law School '97 for research assistance in preparation of this article, and acknowledge Professors
June Carbone, Leslie Griffin and Ken Manaster for their helpful comments and

suggestions.
1. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (determining that defendant has right to verdict based solely on evidence and relevant law); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965) (explaining that defendant is entitled to "his

day in court, not in a stadium, or a city, or nationwide arena"); Irwin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (deciding that verdict must be based solely on evidence

developed at trial, "regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life which he occupies"); Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (determining that verdict in case is to be
"induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print").
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cided by a jury sworn to put aside any bias or prejudice, to
consider only the admissible evidence, and to ignore the pressures of public opinion. But it has never been assumed that
we can maintain our courts as air-sealed vacuums that will
never be contaminated by public opinion.
The traditional safeguards we have relied upon to insure
the ability of jurors to put aside bias or prejudice are voir dire
questioning (to inspect the "baggage" jurors bring with them),
challenges for cause (to remove jurors who are biased),
changes of venue (to move the location of the trial) and sequestration (to insulate jurors from pervasive publicity).
Contrary to popular impressions, these tools are not designed
to supply us with jurors who are completely ignorant of a
high profile case, but rather to assist us in finding jurors who
remain skeptical, who are truly willing to suspend judgment
until they have evaluated the evidence. Rather than enhancing these traditional safeguards to make them more effective,
however, the modern trend is to devalue and dismantle them,
on the grounds they consume too much time, are too expensive, or are too invasive and burdensome for jurors. 2
Instead, we have focused our attention upon a largely futile effort to control the flow of information to the media.
Rules have been formulated to prevent lawyers from commenting upon pending cases.3 Laws have been enacted to
punish witnesses who sell their stories.4 Judges have formulated gag orders to silence trial participants, and occasionally
have held reporters in contempt for refusing to identify their
sources. 5 Rather than suppress the barrage of publicity surrounding high profile cases, however, these efforts more often
2. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN
COURTROOM (1994); Albert W. Alschuler, Our FalteringJury, in POSTMORTEM,
THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996); GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME (1995); HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY (1996).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1994).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5 (West 1995).

5. In re Beth Willon, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (1996) (reversing trial court's
judgment of contempt of television reporter and news director for refusing to
furnish identity of person who provided information in violation of protective
order); Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975) (reversing in part
trial court's judgment of contempt and remanding in part for newsmen's refusal
to answer questions during court proceedings relating to possible violation of
protective and seal orders); Farr v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971)
(finding newspaper reporter in contempt for refusing to provide names of persons who furnished him with copies of statement disclosing that the defendants
planned other murders). In Willon, the Farrrationale was distinguished and
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spur the media to a relentless pursuit of even more questionable sources of information.
The greatest danger to our ideal of fair trials has now
become the nameless and faceless leaker of information
whom we see quoted as "a source close to the investigation" or
"a knowledgeable member of the defense team." Rather than
seeking to suppress identifiable sources of information, our
goal should be to encourage the flow of information to the
public that is attributed to an identified source, who takes
public responsibility for its accuracy and appropriateness.
The public, including potential jurors, will then be better
equipped to critically evaluate the information, and assess its
reliability and credibility.
The approach currently utilized by our courts frequently
diminishes the flow of information attributed to identified
sources, and increases the flow of information coming from
unidentified leaks. Current "shield laws" encourage the leaking of information by protecting the leaker from any consequences for his breach of confidentiality, and place no responsibility on reporters for lack of restraint in promising
confidentiality to their sources. Somehow the irony has escaped us, that we encourage irresponsible breaches of confidentiality by guaranteeing to violators that we will protect
the confidentiality of their breach! Those who have no respect for confidentiality that protects others are rewarded by
our guarantee of absolute confidentiality for their treachery.
It is possible to identify the kinds of information that actually present a clear and present danger to the fairness of
trials if prematurely released. This information will fall into
very narrow categories of highly probative evidence that may
be excluded at trial. Courts can and should issue protective
orders to preserve the confidentiality of such information.
Once protective orders are issued, courts should rigorously
enforce them. Trial participants should be severely disciplined for unauthorized leaks of information included in protective orders. Courts can and should employ the contempt
power to punish those responsible for the publication of such
information, and shield laws should not protect the identity
of those who leak it.
held to be inapplicable to cases decided after the shield law was incorporated
into the state Constitution via the passing of Proposition 5 in 1980.
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It is unrealistic, however, to attempt to purge trials of
any trace of external publicity. The advocacy of lawyers and
other trial participants cannot be confined to the courtroom.
An objective of complete separation of a court of law from the
court of public opinion is unattainable, and we should readily
admit that it cannot be achieved. The level of public interest
in high profile trials simply cannot be controlled, and the media will inevitably respond with whatever information is
available. We cannot begin to fathom all the subtle ways in
which public opinion seeps into a courtroom and affects the
attitudes of every participant in a trial. The traditional tools
of voir dire, challenges for cause, changes of venue and sequestration deserve greater respect and attention as our best
safeguard against media intrusion. Acceptance of this reality, however, does not mean that we cannot achieve a more
modest goal of delaying public disclosure of truly critical information until its admissibility has been determined in the
courtroom.
The public is more sophisticated and discerning in sorting out the available information than we generally give it
credit for.' It will usually be aided in that process by identification of the source of the information it is receiving. The
message we should send to trial participants is not to be silent. The lawyers or police officers or victims standing on the
courthouse steps in front of television cameras are not the
gravest danger to our ideal of fair trials. The gravest danger
is the faceless and nameless "leak." The message we need to
deliver to trial participants is to stand up and take responsibility for public statements. The message we should send to
the media is not to report less. It is to report responsibly, to
resort to unidentified sources only when the information being reported is not protected by a court order and the source
is lawfully entitled to release the information. And the
6. See Susan Walton, Puzzling Evidence,

PSYCHOL. TODAY,

Aug. 1987, at

10; Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-legal Evidence Suggests About the FairTrial-FreePress Issue, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1989); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court'sDecision in Nebraska
Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News
Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977). A recent Louis Harris poll for the
Center for Media and Public Affairs disclosed a high level of public skepticism
about news reports: 44% of respondents said the news media are "often inaccu-

rate," and only one in three thought the "media deal fairly with all sides." SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1996, at 12A [hereinafter November 1996 Poll].
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message we should send to our courts is to deploy traditional
tools more effectively to insulate the finders of fact from external influences.

II. THE

TRADITIONAL

GOAL AND THE MODERN REALITY

The traditional goal that emerges from the official studies and reports addressing free press and fair trials 7 is to announce the arrest in a high profile case much like the arrangements for a prize fight, with the public being exhorted
to "stay tuned." "Full details will be divulged when the case
comes to trial in two years." The police should refer all questions to the prosecutors, and the prosecutors and defense lawyers should simply respond, "no comment" when called by the
press. When jurors are summoned, they will have little
knowledge of the case. If any information has seeped
through, the juror will be politely excused.
Was it ever like this? Many blame the pervasive presence of television cameras for the current problems of pretrial
publicity, but high profile trials attracted enormous public attention long before television, and excesses of zealous reporting appear to have been the norm, rather than the exception.
Two months after Lizzie Borden was arrested for the
murder of her father and step-mother in Fall River, Massachusetts in 1892, the Boston Globe ran a front page story
claiming to summarize the testimony of twenty-five new witnesses who were available to link Ms. Borden to the crime.8
The story included an allegation that Lizzie was pregnant,
and had argued with her father over the identity of her
lover.9 "Affidavits" from these alleged witnesses had been
leaked by a private detective assisting the Fall River police,
apparently upon the payment of $500 cash. 10 The circulation
of the newspaper soared. A follow-up story boasting of their
journalistic coup was headlined: "ASTOUNDED. All New
England Read Story. Globes Were Bought By
Thousands. Lizzie Borden Appears in New Light. Be7. See, e.g., PAUL C. REARDON & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS, A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. 1-36 (1968).

8. FRANK SPIERING, LIZZIE 99 (1984). See also EDMUND PEARSON, TRIAL OF

LIZZIE BORDEN (Notable Trials Library 1989) (1937) (providing in-depth analysis of Lizzie Borden's trial).

9.

SPIERING,

10. Id.

supra note 8, at 99.
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lief in Her Innocence Sadly Shaken. Excitement Runs
High in Fall River. Police Think the Scoop is a
Corker."11
When most of the affidavits were exposed as fabrications,
the Globe published an apology.12 The young reporter who
wrote the story was indicted for tampering with witnesses
and fled to Canada, where he died in an apparent suicide
under the wheels of a train. 3 The jury that was impaneled
14
eight months later acquitted Lizzie Borden.
In 1907, the trial of Harry Thaw for the murder of New
York architect Stanford White provided a salacious menu of
sexual escapades, as Thaw publicly proclaimed that White
"ruined" his show-girl wife.1 5 The graphic reports of titillating testimony that filled American newspapers led President Theodore Roosevelt to demand that newspapers detailing "the full disgusting particulars of the case" should be
banned from the U.S. mail.' 6 The defendant's wealthy
mother hired press agents to plant stories sympathetic to his
cause, and even financed the production of a play dramatizing the events leading up to the murder with a slant
favorable to her son's cause. 17 The New York Evening Journal elicited reader's letters on the question, "Was Thaw Justified in Killing Stanford White?"' 8 The newspaper ran a daily
tabulation, which finally totaled 2,054 Guilty, 5,119 Not
Guilty.' 9 The jurors that ultimately acquitted Thaw on
grounds of insanity received so much hate mail they formed a
mutual protection society.
When the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann for the kidnap and murder of the infant son of Charles Lindbergh began
in 1934, seven hundred reporters, photographers and commentators converged on a tiny New Jersey courtroom. 20
Although the judge banned cameras from the court, a clan11. Id.
12. Id. at 101.
13. Id. at 103.
14. Id. at 102-03, 175.
15. GERALD LANGFORD, THE MURDER OF STANFORD WHITE 19 (Notable Trials Library 1996) (1962).
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id. at 49-50.
18. Id. at 49.
19. Id.
20. David A. Anderson, Democracy and the Demystification of Courts: An
Essay, 14 REV. LITIG. 627, 627 (1995).
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destine newsreel camera was concealed behind a fan in the
courtroom to capture footage for newsreels. 2 Lawyers subpoenaed celebrity friends so they could get a seat in the courtroom. 2 2 The prosecutor held daily press conferences, and an-

nounced at one that he would "wrap the kidnap ladder right
around Hauptmann's neck."23 He was said to have an uncanny knack of playing to the hidden newsreel camera.24 The
defense lawyer countered with press announcements that key
evidence had been planted, and had business cards printed
up with an embossed depiction of the kidnap ladder and a
notation that he was "Chief Counsel, The LindberghHauptmann Trial."25 He defended his actions by saying,
"[p]ublicity in cases of this kind is essential, especially in
view of the vast amounts of publicity which issued from the
prosecutor's office from the moment this defendant was arrested."26 His words have a familiar ring!
All of these trials, and scores of other "high profile" trials
in American history, were followed by the same sort of sanctimonious editorializing we have seen in the wake of the O.J.
Simpson trial: the lawyers were castigated for turning the
case into a "circus," and the media was castigated for pandering to the public appetite for sensationalism. But the "traditional view" that lawyers should confine their advocacy to the
courtroom seems to have very little American reality to back
it up. The prevailing modern view seems to recognize that
the public's intense interest in high profile trials should be
served, even if public opinion finds a way of seeping into the
courtroom. The lawyer who ignores public opinion or disdains the opportunity to influence or shape it does so at the
peril of his client. The courts already have available the tools
they need to insulate courtroom proceedings from prejudicial
publicity. Jurors are just as capable today as jurors in the
past have been to separate the media spin from the evidence
in court.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, supra note 20, at 630.

950
III.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

WHY Do TRIAL PARTICIPANTS SEEK TO INFLUENCE
PUBLIC OPINION?

Trial participants who speak for public consumption do
so for a variety of reasons. Identifying those reasons will assist in assessing the value of public attribution of their statements. Start with the police conducting an investigation.
They are ordinarily the first source of information about a
pending case. What motivates them in deciding what information to provide to the media? First, they may want to reassure a nervous populace that a culprit has been identified or
apprehended, to relieve community tension. While expressions of confidence they have the right person may be inconsistent with a presumption of innocence, prospective jurors
are fully capable of understanding that police confidence in
the guilt of an arrested person is not itself persuasive evidence of guilt. Second, police may want to enlist public
assistance in ongoing investigative efforts to locate victims,
witnesses or evidence. Third, they may want to influence
public opinion about their own competence, to increase public
confidence they are doing a good job. Fourth, they may want
to enhance the prospect of a successful prosecution, by increasing public confidence in a suspect's guilt. Finally, they
may be advancing some personal agenda by earning or returning media favor.
Prosecutors may share any and all of the motives of the
police. Public apprehension may find greater relief with an
announcement charges have been filed, than with a police announcement of an arrest. The need for public assistance may
not end when the prosecution commences. Public confidence
one is doing a good job becomes especially important to one
whose office is elective. The enhancement of prospects for ultimate conviction may also become a more powerful motivator, since the prosecutor will be personally identified with
the win or loss. And prosecutors will have personal agendas
to earn or return media favor too. A high profile case may be
a stepping stone to a judgeship, another elective office, or
even a media career.
In addition to the motives they share with police, prosecutors may have tactical motives for releasing information
that they believe will influence the way the case is handled by
others. Their real purpose may not be to inform the public,
but to convey a message to the judge, or to opposing counsel.
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They may also be trying to increase the odds that questionable evidence will be admitted by the judge at trial. A trial
judge is well aware that a claim that the defendant was
prejudiced by the release of evidence prior to trial will be rendered "harmless error" if the evidence is later admitted.2 7
The admissibility of evidence at trial is frequently a close
question left to the discretion of the trial judge. Prosecutors
know that the trial judge's eagerness to compile a trial record
inviting affirmance by a higher court may push the judge in
the direction of admitting evidence that was released prior to
trial, to foreclose any claim that the pretrial release
prejudiced the defendant.
Defense lawyers who are representing a client may believe that a variety of the interests of the client will be served
by the public release of information. First, of course, they
may want to enhance the prospects of a favorable disposition
of the case, by creating public sympathy for their client or
doubts about the prosecution's case. The opportunity to create sympathy for the defendant may be greater than the opportunity presented at the trial itself, since offering "good
character" evidence at trial opens the door for the prosecution
to offer evidence of "bad character."28
The planting of doubts involves very traditional tools of
advocacy. If a reporter calls and asks for a comment on a
story that new evidence of your client's guilt has been exposed, the defense lawyer will want the story to include the
reasons the evidence might be mistrusted, such as the bias of
a witness or the possibility of a mistake. A revelation of
damning evidence accompanied by the observation that the
defendant's lawyer had "no comment" will simply enhance
the credibility of the story. Second, the defense lawyer may
27. During the 1980s, there were at least 3100 claims by criminal defendants that pretrial publicity had prejudiced their right to a fair trial. Newton N.
Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an ImpartialJuror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 636 (1991). Most of these claims were rejected, frequently
on the grounds that the publicity was rendered harmless by subsequent admission of the same information as evidence at trial. The number of cases where a
claim of prejudicial publicity led to a reversal of a conviction was never very
high, and in recent years has sharply declined.
28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (permitting prosecutor to rebut evidence of character offered by the accused). Character witnesses offered by an
accused can also be cross-examined as to whether they "had heard" about specific acts of misconduct by the accused. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 477 (1948).
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share a client's concern for his reputation or public image
apart from the pending charges. A client who is never prosecuted, or who is prosecuted and acquitted, may have been illserved by a lawyer who allowed public speculation about his
guilt to go unchallenged. Security guard Richard Jewell, for
example, was subjected to intensive media speculation regarding F.B.I. suspicions of his involvement in the bombing
at Atlanta's Centennial Park during last Summer's Olympic
Games.2 9 Third, defense lawyers may want to send public
messages to the police, the prosecutors, witnesses or the
judge for some tactical reason.
Occasionally, defense lawyers are pursuing the public
agenda of some organization other than their client. The role
of the Communist Party in the defense of the Scottsboro Boys
comes to mind.3 0 And, of course, defense lawyers are certainly motivated by personal agendas, such as self aggrandizement. Not only is free advertising hard to resist, there
may be a book deal or a screen play waiting in the wings, or
even a new career as a television commentator. Most rarely
of all, a defense lawyer may be financing the case by the sale
of information. Such an arrangement creates a serious conflict of interest, but one that some courts have permitted the
client to waive. 1
While lawyers rarely welcome the defendant himself as a
public spokesperson, the phenomenon of celebrity defendants
29. NBC announced a settlement for an undisclosed amount of a lawsuit
brought by Richard Jewell following a national newscast in which Tom Brokaw
speculated, "[tihey probably have enough to arrest him right now, probably
enough to prosecute him. But you always want to have enough to convict him
as well." SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 16, 1996, at 7C. The NBC statement
on the settlement cited protection of its unnamed sources as "a major consideration." Id.
30. Gerald F. Uelmen, 2001, A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 13, 16.
See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969)
(providing a full account of the struggle between the NAACP and the International Labor Defense to control the defense case).
31. John Gibeaut, Defend and Tell, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996 at 64. See Maxwell
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606 (1982) (upholding waiver of a conflict of interest created by giving a defense lawyer media rights); Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d
1258 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding waiver of a conflict of interest created by giving
a defense lawyer media rights). See also Gerald F. Uelmen, Conflicts and Criminal Malpractice: The Titanic Cases, CAL. ST. B.J., Dec. 1979 at 504 (examining
defendant's waiver of a conflict of interest created by granting attorney exclusive literary and dramatic property rights to the defendant's life story in return
for legal representation).
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or corporate defendants hiring a public relations consultant
to handle trial publicity is not unheard of. Their motive is
rarely ambiguous. Investments of millions of dollars may depend upon "damage control." Consider, for example, the
costly impact upon the career of rock star Michael Jackson
posed by child molestation charges. While charges were
never filed, confidential investigative reports were leaked to
the media.3 2
The O.J. Simpson trials brought to the limelight dozens
of other trial participants with their own motives to influence
public opinion. Family members of the defendant stepped
forward to defend his character from personal attack, while
family members of the victims were anxious to rebut any public disparagement of their loved ones. The "victim's rights"
movement has done much to transform our concept of public
justice into a system of private retribution, and we should not
have any illusions that the voice given to previously voiceless
victims will only be heard in the courtroom. The media have
discovered that victims and their families are a compelling
presence in trial coverage. Even witnesses may be motivated
to capitalize on their new-found celebrity. The payment of
cash to witnesses for exclusive rights to their "stories" has
3
become a common practice of the tabloid media. " While the
receipt of such payments has now been made criminal in California, there are reasons to doubt the enforceability of this
prohibition.3 4 In any event, the siren's song of instant celebrity may be a more powerful inducement to some witnesses
than cash, especially if they see some way to convert their
celebrity to cash later.
When we sort through the myriad of motives that lead
police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, defendants, victims and
witnesses to become news sources, we can readily distinguish
those objectives which are served by speaking for attribution,
from those which are served by surreptitious leaks. The appropriate goals of assuaging public fears or enlisting public
32. See Rothman v. Jackson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (1996).
33. Tabloid newspapers and television programs made cash payments to
potential witnesses in the recent trials of O.J. Simpson, William Kennedy
Smith, Pamela Smart, Jim Bakker and Amy Fisher, as well as the Michael
Jackson investigation. See Scott C. Pugh, Checkbook Journalism,Free Speech,
and Fair Trials, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1739 (1995).
34. Id.; Gerald F. Uelmen, O.J. Court Pundits Beware, CAL. CRIM. DEF.
PRACT. RPTR., Feb. 1995, at 53.
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assistance or projecting an image of competence will best be
served by public announcements from a readily identifiable
spokesperson. The questionable goal of enhancing the prospects for conviction or acquittal may be better served by
leaks. The sleazy process of currying media favor will usually
be better served by leaks, since giving anyone an "exclusive"
in a statement for public attribution usually makes more enemies than friends. A well-placed leak makes a friend and
leaves potential enemies not knowing whom to hate.
Criminal defense lawyers sometimes have to contend
with a "sleaze" factor that police and prosecutors do not ordinarily face. Information from an unidentified source may
sometimes have greater credibility than a public announcement from a criminal defense lawyer. The presumptions that
apply to police and prosecutors might even be reversed for
defense lawyers. The personal agendas are achieved by public statements, while the goal of undermining public confidence in a client's guilt, or preserving his reputation, are
often effectively served by leaks. This offers no justification
for leaking, however. It merely magnifies the harm the leak
imposes by depriving the public of the means to assess the
credibility of information. Lawyers remain advocates for
their clients in the "court" of public opinion, and it is appropriate that the public take their advocacy role into account in
assessing the credibility of their statements.
From an ethical perspective, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the use of surreptitious leaks by a lawyer directly involved in a case can be justified. A defense lawyer
may argue that his or her chief obligation is to advance the
cause of the client, and the choice of whether to issue a statement for public attribution or to leak information to the press
is simply a tactical choice driven by whichever better serves
the interests of the client. But the defense lawyer's advocacy
has always been limited by the constraints of what the law
allows. The law certainly does not allow the surreptitious
leaking of information that presents a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, nor does it permit leaking of
information included in a protective order issued by a court.
While the law does allow a lawyer to be an advocate for
his client in the public forum, there should be no hesitation to
say that an advocate must "enter an appearance" in the court
of public opinion, just as he must enter an appearance in
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court. If we are going to recognize the right of a lawyer to
enter the arena of public opinion on behalf of a client, why
should we hesitate to demand that he identify himself as the
source of information, so the public can accurately assess his
credibility? The exceptional circumstances where public advocacy is permitted but the client's interest might be better
served by anonymity do not justify vesting lawyers with discretion to speak anonymously that more frequently will be
exercised to serve their own interests. For prosecutors,
whose only appropriate justification for leaking can be the
public interest, the balance is easier to cast: the public interest will always be better served by identification of the source
of information.
It would be naivet6 of the highest order to suggest that
opening the door to public statements by trial participants
will close the door to surreptitious leaking. Even when trial
participants feel perfectly free to speak for attribution, they
will have reasons to prefer to remain anonymous. The reasons to remain anonymous, however, will rarely be reasons
that serve the public interest or the cause ofjustice. From an
ethical perspective, attribution should be preferred, since it
gives the public vital information necessary to evaluate the
weight to be given the information. Concealing the identity
of the source conceals the motives and agendas for its release.
Those motives and agendas relate directly to credibility.
Too often, the choice of attribution or anonymity is left
completely to the source. Few journalists apparently ponder
the ethical consequences of that choice, or approach it from
any perspective other than how best to get someone to "open
up." The new Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional
Journalists invites journalists to approach the choice of attribution or anonymity from an ethical perspective:
Identify sources whenever feasible. The public is entitled
to as much information as possible on sources' reliability.
Always question sources' motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise made
in exchange for information. Keep promises.
Avoid undercover or other surreptitious methods of gathering information except when traditional open methods
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will not yield information vital to the public. Use of such
methods should be explained as part of the story. 3 5
IV.

Is

RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM AN OXYMORON?

Journalists are known to occasionally laugh at the concept of "legal ethics" as an oxymoron. It seems fair to ask
whether "responsible journalism" is also an inherent contradiction. The real problem in defining a code of ethics to govern journalists is that there is no longer any agreement upon
who is a "journalist," if there ever was. In 1926, when Sigma
Delta Chi, the "Society of Professional Journalists," first
promulgated a Code of Ethics, journalists were generally
thought of as newspaper reporters. While ferreting out news
stories was a highly competitive enterprise back then, newspaper reporters knew who their competitors were. They were
the reporters who worked for other newspapers.
Today, consider all the sources of information about a
pending trial. Most Americans rely for most of their news
upon television news shows. 6 A debate continues to rage
among journalists whether television news is a venture in
journalism, or simply public entertainment. The print media
divide themselves between "legitimate" press and the "tabloid" press. What distinguishes the tabloids is not just their
means of gathering stories (they pay cash), but the nature of
the stories that interest them. For them, "public interest"
and "prurient interest" mean the same thing. Now the "tabloid" television shows have created a similar division between
"legitimate" television news reporters and shows such as
"Hard Copy" and "A Current Affair." And then what do you
do with the "talk shows?" The outrageous is highly valued
35. Soc'Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (DOCUMENT No. 403) 1
(Soc'y of Prof. Journalists, Greencastle, Ind. Sept. 21, 1996) (the document will
be faxed on demand).
36. A Louis Harris poll conducted from November 8 to 30, 1996 for the
Center for Media and Public Affairs asked 3,004 adults what their most important news source was, with the following results:
Local T.V . N ew s ....................................................
34%
Network T.V. Newscasts ............................................
17%
C N N ..............................................................
10%
Local Newspapers ..................................................
15%
R adio .............................................................
8%
Television Morning Shows ..........................................
3%
Major National Newspapers .........................................
3%
November 1996 Poll, supra note 6.
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because it provokes a reaction. Is Rush Limbaugh a journalist? Is Geraldo Rivera?
Today's media markets even include "books" that are
produced in less than ten days to exploit high-profile trials
and their participants. Ten days does not allow much time to
check the accuracy of sources. And then there's the Internet.
Instant access to court pleadings and trial transcripts on-line
gives everyone the same raw information that the journalists
are working from.
The proliferation of the news media creates an enormous
vacuum that must be filled. As one astute observer described
it:
The networks are scrambling to produce the most profitable electronic news-magazine shows, and to be number
one in the early morning. CNN's 24-hour coverage sets
the frenzied pace-the insatiable search for guests, and
sources and topics to fill air time and column space. That
coupled with a dearth of time, staff, expertise and financial resources to do adequate research and verification,
make the news and information37media particularly susceptible to litigation journalism.
"Litigation journalism" is a term coined by Carole Gorney to describe the planned use of the news and information
media to create a favorable environment for the positions of
plaintiffs in civil lawsuits. 3 s Her restriction of her definition
to plaintiffs may reflect her own bias. Insurance Companies
are probably the best-financed participants in litigation journalism. The use of media consultants and publicists is much
more widespread in the civil litigation context than the criminal, for obvious reasons. Few criminal defendants have the
resources to mount a major media campaign. In any event,
the reality is that the proliferation of the media has enhanced
the power of litigants and lawyers to manipulate the media.
Today, there are many fertile fields in which to "plant" a
story. Once planted, the competitive frenzy will insure its
growth.
Serving the public "what it wants" has become a much
more scientific process than it used to be. Newspapers could
37. Carole Gorney, Model Rules and Litigation Journalism: Enough or
Enough Is Enough?, N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 6, 10.
38. Carole Gorney, Litigation Journalismis a Scourge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1993, at A15.

958

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

only roughly gage the public interest in a story by measuring
their day to day circulation. For television, ratings provide
instant gratification. CNN viewership increased 700% during the four days of each week that it covered the Simpson
trial,3 9 while Court TV's ratings were up 1,000% during opening statements in the trial.4 ° These ratings, of course, had
much to do with the unprecedented level of media attention
the trial received.
It has been suggested that, just as bad money drives out
the good, bad journalism drives out the good. Increasing
costs and decreasing ratings have reportedly led network
news shows to adopt the lower standards of local news programs, which in turn are pressured by the "general Geraldoization" of television programming. 4 ' Alternative media
thrive by exploiting the stories the mainstream media will
not touch. Thus, voluntary restraints accepted by newspapers or television news shows may just create more opportunities for the tabloid media to exploit. When they do, the
mainstream media feel compelled to at least do a story dumping on the tabloids for their irresponsibility. The tabloid story
thus gets bootstrapped into a major media story.
The net result of media proliferation may simply be a declining loss of credibility for all media.4 2 Potential jurors may
not be as strongly affected by news stories as previously believed. This may simply reflect the fact that Americans do
not believe everything they read in newspapers or see on television, at least to the same extent they did in the past. A
healthy public skepticism may be our saving grace. More and
more jurors may show up at the courthouse who have heard
or read about the case they will sit on, but can honestly say
they don't really "know" anything about the case, because
American media are no longer in the business of conveying
knowledge. They are in the business of entertainment, and
39. Brian McGrory, For Many, Simpson TV Trial is Irresistible, BOSTON
Jan. 28, 1995, at 1.
40. John Strahinich, Court TV's Rising Star, BOSTON GLOBE (MAGAZINE),
Mar. 19, 1995, at 24.
41. John Leo, Crime: That's Entertainment,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
6, 1989, at 53.
42. Forty-four percent of respondents said the news media are "often inaccurate." November 1996 Poll, supra note 6. Journalists were perceived as
"more arrogant" than others by 42%, "more cynical" by 31%, "less compassionate" by 33%, and "more biased" by 34%. Id.
GLOBE,
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the public being entertained is smart enough to realize it.
This is all the more reason to focus our energy on conveying
to the public the information it needs to make a truly informed evaluation of the credibility of news sources, rather
than a futile effort to control access to those sources.
The journalist's ethic of protecting confidential sources of
information should not be left completely in the hands of each
individual journalist to define. Other contexts in which confidentiality is protected by an evidentiary privilege require an
express or implied promise of confidentiality to serve some
publicly recognized goal. A communication to a priest, a physician or a lawyer would not be legally protected simply because the recipient promised confidentiality, if the confidentiality were not related to the publicly recognized goal of
administering spiritual counseling, medical treatment or
legal advice. Each of these privileges is also limited by exceptions, such as the one for communications to further a criminal venture.
As with any other professional, journalists should be subjected to limits upon their ability to guarantee confidentiality
to news sources. One appropriate limit would be a caveat
that sources such as lawyers, witnesses, police and other participants in pending court proceedings cannot be utilized as
sources without attribution if doing so violates a valid protective order or a rule of professional conduct of their own
profession.
When a valid protective order is breached, the responsibility of the journalist who published the protected information should not be limited to compelled disclosure of the
source to be sanctioned. Sanctions should be directly imposed upon the offending news organization as well. In the
1990 prosecution of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, the
U.S. Bureau of Prisons intercepted and taped confidential telephone conversations between Noriega and his lawyer.4 3 The
tapes were leaked to the Cable News Network. 4 4 U.S. District Judge William Hoeveler learned of CNN's possession of
the tapes, and warned the network that their use would violate a previous protective order issued in the case.4 5 In what
43. Special to the New York Times, CNN Is Sentenced for Tapes and Makes
Public Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, at B7.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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can only be described as an egregious example of media irresponsibility, CNN aired segments of the tapes eleven times
over two days.4 6 Judge Hoeveler found CNN guilty of criminal contempt of court, and gave it a choice: pay a hefty fine,
or make a public apology and be fined far less." The network
opted for broadcasting a public apology.4" CNN also was assessed $85,000 for the government's legal fees.4 9 The identity
of the leaker, however, was never disclosed.

V.

GAG RULES AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS

"Gag Rules" are rules of professional conduct that attempt to regulate the conduct of lawyers in all cases. They
are enforced through professional discipline imposed by the
State Bar, rather than by individual judges in a particular
case. A "Protective Order," also frequently called "gag order,"
however, is entered in a particular case by a judge to govern
the conduct of participants appearing in the case.
The principal "gag rule" governing the conduct of American lawyers is the Model Rule promulgated by the American
Bar Association, which has been widely adopted by many
State Bar organizations.5" The question of the validity of the
rule under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
came before the United States Supreme Court in 1991, in a
case from Las Vegas, Nevada. 5 A lawyer named Dominic
Gentile had been retained to represent Grady Sanders, the
owner of a vault used to store the drugs and money seized by
narcotics officers of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. 2 When four kilograms of cocaine and almost
$300,000 in travelers' checks were reported missing from the
vault, a grand jury investigation was launched which led to
the indictment of Grady Sanders. 5 3 There was great press interest in the case, and law enforcement officials thought it
was important to maintain public confidence in the police department by allaying suspicions that police detectives who
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Special to the New York Times, supra note 43, at B7.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1994).
51. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
52. Id. at 1039-40.
53. Id. at 1039, 1044.
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had unlimited access to the vault were responsible.5 4 During
the course of the investigation, the Deputy Police Chief announced that the two detectives who had access to the vault
had been "cleared," and it was leaked to the press that they
had passed lie detector tests.5 5 (It later turned out that the lie
detector tests had been administered by a man who was arrested for distributing cocaine to an F.B.I. informant.5 6 )
After his client was indicted, Dominic Gentile held a
press conference.5 7 At the press conference, he charged that
the accusations against his client were part of a police coverup.
When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you're going to see that the evidence will prove not only that Grady
Sanders is an innocent person and had nothing to do with
any of the charges that are being leveled against him, but
that the person that was in the most direct position to
have stolen the drugs and the money, the American Express Travelers' checks, is Detective Steve Scholl. There
is far more evidence that will establish that Detective
Scholl took these drugs and took these American Express
Travelers' checks than any other living human being.
And I have to say that I feel that Grady Sanders is being
used as a scapegoat to try to cover up for what has to be
obvious to people at Las Vegas Metropolitan 5Police
De8
partment and at the District Attorney's Office.
Dominic Gentile's prediction turned out to be quite accurate. Grady Sanders was found not guilty by a jury, based on
a defense that pinned the blame on police detectives.5 9 Nonetheless, Gentile was brought before the State Bar of Nevada
on charges that he violated a rule based on the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct."0 That
rule prohibited lawyers from making any statements to the
press "if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it
will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding."6 1 The only thing the rule permitted
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
ary 5,
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1040-41.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1030.
Id. app. A at 1059 (quoting petitioner's opening remarks at the Febru1988 press conference).
Id. at 1047-48.
NEV. SuP. CT. R. 177.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
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a lawyer to state was "the general nature of the claim or defense," without elaboration. 62 The State Bar concluded that
Dominic Gentile had violated this rule, and they reprimanded him. 63 Gentile challenged this reprimand before the
United States Supreme Court, arguing that his comments at
the press conference were protected by the First Amendment
guaranty of free speech. 64 Gentile's case was argued before
the Supreme Court by Professor Michael Tigar of the University of Texas, 6 5 currently appearing in defense of Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma City bombing case.
The Gentile case split the United States Supreme Court
right down the middle. 66 Chief Justice William Rehnquist articulated the traditional view, noting that lawyers are "officers of the court," and that status provides both an aura of
greater credibility and a constitutional basis for greater regulation of their speech. 67 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[blecause lawyers have special access to information
through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of the pending
proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely to be received
as especially authoritative."68
The modern view was espoused by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who recognized that a defense lawyer must represent a
client in the "court of public opinion" as well as the
courtroom.
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom
door. He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of
a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may
recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the
adverse consequences of a possible loss after trial, so too
an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's
reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution deemed un69
just or commenced with improper motives.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1031-32.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071-74.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1043.
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While Chief Justice Rehnquist's views of the appropriate
role of defense lawyers won five votes to Justice Kennedy's
four, one of Rehnquist's votes "jumped ship" when it came to
the question of upholding the reprimand the State Bar dished
out to Dominic Gentile.7 ° Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
switched sides and gave Kennedy a majority to hold that the
Rule itself was unconstitutional, because it was too vague in
defining what lawyers could say and couldn't say. 7 1 Gentile,
for example, could have reasonably believed that his press
conference was well within the exception permitting a statement about "the general nature of the claim or defense."72
After the Gentile case the American Bar Association
modified the model rule the court struck down. First, the exception for statements describing the "general nature" of the
claim or defense, which the court found unconstitutionally
vague, has been changed. The rule now permits only the
"claim, offense or defense involved" itself to be identified.
Second, a new exception permits a lawyer to respond to protect a client from the undue prejudicial effect of publicity initiated by someone else. The lawyer can release as much information as necessary to "mitigate the recent adverse
publicity."7 3
California had no rule of professional conduct to regulate
lawyers' statements before or during a trial until October 1,
1995. Citing what he described as the Simpson case "circus,"
State Senator Quentin L. Kopp of San Francisco sponsored a
bill to require the State Bar to adopt a disciplinary rule governing trial publicity by lawyers. The California State Bar
reluctantly recommended a rule that would give maximum
First Amendment protection for lawyer's statements, by requiring a showing of "clear and present danger" that a lawyer's statement threatened a fair trial before it could be prohibited. The California Supreme Court rejected that
recommendation, and instead promulgated the American Bar
Association's modified model rule to take effect in California
on October 1, 1995. In its entirety, that rule now provides:
(A) A member who is participating or has participated in
the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make
70. Id. at 1081-82.
71. Id. at 1082.
*72. Id.
73. MODEL RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.6 (1994).
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an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the member knows or reasonably should
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (A) a member may state:
the claim, offense or defense involved, and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the
persons involved;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence
and information necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a
person involved, when there is reason to believe
that there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs
(1) through (6):
(a) the identity, residence, occupation, and
family status of the accused:
(b) if the accused has not been apprehended,
information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(c) the fact, time, and place of arrest; and
(d) the identity of investigating and arresting
officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.
(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (A), a member may
make a statement that a reasonable member would
believe is required to protect a client from substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not
initiated by the member or the member's client. A
statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be
limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.7 4
(1)

The efficacy of this new rule remains to be seen. It has
been suggested that the problem of ambiguity that led the
Supreme Court to invalidate the previous version of the rule
has not been cured.7 5 I believe that even if the new rule had
74. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-120 (1995).
75. Gabriel G. Gregg, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed

Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L.

REV.

1321 (1996);
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been in effect during the Simpson trial, everything that was
said by the lawyers would have been protected by the "mitigation" exception which permits lawyers to respond to harmful information released from another source. 76 The real
harm such a vague rule perpetrates, however, is that it compounds the problem of "leaks." Lawyers who lack clear guidance under the rule, rather than take a chance of facing bar
discipline, will make their statements to the press as anonymous confidential sources protected by newsperson's shield
laws, rather than as identifiable persons speaking in public.
To that extent, the public is the loser.
Although Judge Ito never imposed a "gag order" in the
Simpson criminal trial, California trial courts have frequently utilized gag orders to silence trial participants in
high profile trials. Often, "leaks" have occurred despite the
gag orders. The most celebrated example of this pattern occurred during the trial of Charles Manson for the Tate-LaBianca murders in Los Angeles. 77 Early in the proceedings,
Judge Charles Older entered an order prohibiting any attorney, court employee or witness from releasing for public dissemination the content or nature of any testimony to be given
at trial. 78 A statement obtained from witness Virginia Graham was leaked to William Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles HeraldExaminer.7 9 The statement revealed that defendant Susan Atkins had revealed the Manson family plans to
travel cross-country by bus, randomly murdering a series of
celebrities, including Elizabeth Taylor and Frank Sinatra. 0
Farr published a story recounting the statement under the
headline, "Liz, SINATRA ON SLAY LIST - TATE WITNESS." 8 '
The story appeared the day before the witness was
called, and much of the statement was excluded from evidence.8 2 Although the jury was sequestered, the judge orChristopher A. Brown, The Worsening Problem of Trial Publicity: Is "New"
Model Rule 3.6 Solution or Surrender?,29 IND. L. REV. 379 (1995).

76.

GERALD

F.

UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V.

O.J.

SIMPSON 76 (1996).
77. Farr v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971). See VINCENT BUGLIOSI
(WITH CURT GENTRY), HELTER SKELTER, THE TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON

MURDERS 373-74, 399, 486-87 (1974).

78. Farr,99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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dered that the windows of the bus in which they were transported to and from court be covered so as to avoid jurors
seeing the newspaper headline.
At a subsequent hearing, Farr revealed that copies of the
Virginia Graham statement had been leaked to him by three
different sources, including two of the attorneys of record in
the case. 3 While he refused to identify the attorneys, he produced a list of six which he said included his two sources:
Prosecutors Bugliosi, Kay and Musich, and Defense Attorneys Kanarek, Shinn and Fitzgerald. s4 Each of the six attorneys was called to the witness stand, and each of the six denied under oath that he was a source of the document.8 5 Farr
was jailed for contempt, and eventually released after a reviewing court concluded further incarceration could not be
justified by any realistic hope he would identify his source.
After the Farrcase, California media promoted an initiative measure to incorporate a broad shield law into the California constitution. Adopted as Proposition Five in 1980, it
now appears as Article I, Section (2)(b), which provides:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected
with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, or by a press association or wire
service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial,
legislative, or administrative body, or any other body hav-

ing the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured while so connected

or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or
other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communica86
tion to the public.
A subsequent clause extends the same protection to radio
and television news reporters, in virtually identical language.
The California Supreme Court has ruled that the immunity
thus conferred is not absolute: it can be overcome by a defendant who shows a reasonable possibility that the information sought would materially assist his defense. s But where
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 345.
Farr,99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (1995).
Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785 (1990).
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the identity of a source is sought by the court, in order to enforce a protective order by punishing one who has leaked information, the courts have held an even higher standard
must be met: the court must determine there is a "substantial probability" of future violations or leaks that will impair
the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial if the source remains unidentified.88
The federal courts have frequently upheld broad gag orders, but recent rulings have recognized some limits of overbreadth. In the 1984 prosecution of former F.B.I. Agent Richard Miller for espionage, for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the court "must determine which types of extrajudicial statements pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice" in
the case, and then fashion an order specifying the proscribed
types of statements.8 9
There is little justification for gag orders that totally re90
strain lawyers from discussing or arguing a case in public.
Gag orders should limit the dissemination of specific information, the premature release of which would endanger the fairness of the trial. The public is well aware that when lawyers
appear on talk shows or hold press conferences, they are still
representing the interests of their clients-or at least they
should be! For that very reason, public statements of lawyers
are given less credibility than statements from other sources,
and again, they should be. Chief Justice Rehnquist was simply wrong when he asserted, in his Gentile opinion, that the
public statements of lawyers are likely to be received as "especially authoritative."91 My experience suggests just the opposite is true.
Another potential restraint upon extrajudicial commentary by lawyers is the risk of civil liability for defamation.
While California Civil Code § 47 grants immunity to partici88. In re Beth Willon, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (1996).
89. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985). Cf. In
re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
90. But see Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking For Fair Trials in the Information
Age: The Need For More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants,30
U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (1995) (urging the use of a two-tier approach to trial participant gag orders-stringent restraints on trial participant speech prior to trial,
but reduced limitations once the jury has been impaneled and the trial has
begun).
91. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991).
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pants in litigation for statements made in official proceedings, the protection has not been extended to out of court
communications to the press.
In Shahvar v. Superior Court,92 the court declared a lawyer who faxed a copy of a pleading to a news reporter could be
held liable for libel. A subsequent amendment of § 47 protects the receiving news reporter, but still leaves the door
open to hold lawyers liable. In a recent ruling arising in the
aftermath of the investigation of singer Michael Jackson for
child molestation, the court ruled that §47 offered no immunity for lawyers engaged in "litigating in the press." 93 After a
psychological evaluation of the child victim was leaked to the
press, Jackson's attorneys publicly accused the victim's attorney of extortion. 9 4 The accusation was held to be actionable
as libel, even though it was made "in anticipation of litigation."9" Interestingly, the court noted that prosecutors would
have broader immunity than defense lawyers under § 47, because they are protected by an "official duty" privilege. 96
Because a public official's duty includes the duty to keep
the public informed of his or her management of the public business, press releases, press conferences and other
public statements by such officials are covered by the 'official duty' privilege, although similar statements by private litigants are not covered by the litigation privilege. 9 7
On the other hand, prosecutors may be subject to more
stringent rules of professional conduct than defense lawyers.
In addition to the general proscription of extrajudicial statements governing all lawyers subject to A.B.A. Model Rule 3.6,
prosecutors may be subject to the "Special Responsibilities of
Prosecutor" defined in Model Rule 3.8, which provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall, except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood
of heightening public condemnation of the accused.9"
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 (1994).
Rothman v. Jackson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 284, 294 (1996).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 291, 295.
Id. at 294.
Id.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1994).
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Unlike Rule 3.6, which addresses the potential impact
upon a trial, Rule 3.8 addresses the phenomenon of "public
condemnation" directly. And at the federal level, stringent
limitations on press statements by federal prosecutors are
99
imposed by the Code of Federal Regulations.
As carefully constructed as gag orders and gag rules may
be, they are rarely enforced by the court's unquestioned
power to punish those who violate court orders for contempt
of court. Those who are subject to the orders and rules are
well aware that, if the information they want to have published is leaked to a reporter, their identity as the source of
the leak will be protected. Thus, responsibility for the statement is easily evaded. Shield laws function to "trump" the
gag rules and gag orders, by permitting journalists to refuse
to reveal their sources without facing the consequence of a
contempt of court charge.
VI.

SHIELD LAWS AS TRUMP CARDS

The overbreadth of gag orders is rarely challenged,
largely because the lawyers and others who are subject to the
orders can achieve their goals without a direct challenge to
the orders. They can simply leak the information with impunity. News organizations are generally precluded from directly attacking gag orders themselves, on the ground they
lack standing to do so. 100 When a court occasionally seeks to
enforce a gag order by requiring disclosure of the source of
leaked information, the focus becomes the privilege of the
news reporter, rather than the validity of the gag order. The
recent prosecution of Richard Allen Davis for the murder of
Polly Klaas provides a classic example.
After extensive pretrial publicity necessitated a change
of venue from Sonoma County to Santa Clara County, the
Santa Clara County Superior Court issued an expansive protective order prohibiting the release of any evidence that had
not been ruled admissible by the court, as well as any com101 While
ments about testimony already heard or expected.
jury selection was progressing, a local television reporter an99. U.S. Department of Justice, Statements of Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2
(1995).

100. Radio and Television News Ass'n of S. Cal. v. United States Dist. Court,
781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. In re Beth Willon, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 245 (1996).
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nounced that a video taped confession by the suspect would
be offered in evidence, describing it in some detail and commenting on its significance. 10 2 The source for the story was
identified only as "a source close to the investigation. "103
Most of the contents of the confession had already been made
public.14 The trial court subpoenaed the reporter, and demanded the identity of the source, in order to enforce its protective order and "to ensure that no future violations
05
occur."1
When the reporter invoked the protection of California's
Shield Law, she was held in contempt. 10 6 On review, the
Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the contempt order,
holding that there was no evidentiary basis to support the
conclusion that the disclosure was necessary to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial.0 7 The material reported was
already in the -public domain, of minimal significance to the
case, and remediable by effective voir dire.' 08 But rather
than base its ruling on the invalidity of the original protective
order, the court imposed a standard of prejudice to be met
even after a gag order has been violated.
Accordingly, where a violation of a protective or 'gag' order has already occurred, a court should determine the
necessity of disclosure of the newsperson's source by addressing two principal considerations in light of all the
relevant circumstances: (1) If the newsperson does not
disclose the identity of the source, is there a substantial
probability if future violations, or 'leaks', that will impair
the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial? And (2) Are
there reasonable alternatives to disclosure that will protect the interests asserted by both the newsperson and the
defendant?"0 9
Assuming a valid protective order, burdening its enforcement by requiring a showing of substantial probability of future violations if it is not enforced seems extravagant. The
problem in this case, of course, was that the original protec102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250-51.
In re Beth Willon, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 250.
Id. at 258-60.
Id. at 258.
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tive order was itself extravagant. If the protective order itself
is supported by adequate findings that disclosure of the information protected would imperil the defendant's right to a fair
trial, requiring disclosure of the violator should not depend
upon a showing of actual need for deterrence. That merely
creates a presumption that a violator remains immune from
punishment unless we can establish not only his past violation, but his readiness to engage in future violations.
The first step for a court called upon to compel disclosure
of the source of a leak should be to ascertain that there is a
valid protective order which was violated. If there was, a
source subject to the protective order should not be protected
by a privilege at all. The issuance of a protective order should
require a compelling showing that the release of the protected
information would create a clear and present danger to the
fairness of pending judicial proceedings, however.
This more demanding standard would, of course, mean
that fewer protective orders would be issued, and those that
were issued would be narrowly drawn. Certain types of information have a general tendency to create prejudice, and
would be frequent candidates for inclusion in protective
orders:
(1) a defendant's prior criminal record, or observations
about his character;
(2) statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to
make a statement; and
(3) reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory
tests, or to the refusal of the defendant to submit to such tests
or examinations.
Protective orders ordinarily need not encompass arguments about the evidence, since such arguments can be countered with contrary arguments in public as well as in the
courtroom. The mere fact that certain types of information
have a "tendency" to create prejudice should not justify the
issuance of a protective order, without a specific showing of
the danger of prejudice in a particular case. If protective orders were subjected to demanding scrutiny, trial participants
would remain free to speak, with full attribution, regarding
many aspects of the case that are now encompassed within
gag rules or gag orders. If they trespassed into protected ar-
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eas, they could be quickly called to account. But if they deliberately sought to evade the protective order by the surreptitious leaking of protected information, no privilege should
protect their identity. A Shield Law should not be elevated
into a "trump card" that gives absolute protection to those
whose goal is the subversion of the right to a fair trial.
An absolute condition for protection of a confidential
source under a shield law should be that the source was
promised confidentiality. The whole rationale for Shield
Laws is that they are necessary to persuade reluctant sources
to provide information by guaranteeing their anonymity. If a
professional rule or regulation imposes an obligation to maintain confidentiality, and provides that a promise of anonymity for a breach is void and unenforceable, there should be no
expectation of confidentiality when members of that profession speak to journalists. This objective could be easily
achieved for the legal profession by adoption of the following
proposed rule.
Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct
(A) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in
the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an
extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if
the lawyer knows or should know either that it will present a
clear and present danger to the fairness of an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter, or that it will disclose information
included in a valid protective order issued in the matter.
(B) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in
the investigation or litigation of a matter shall make no extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication without attribution and identification of the source. No such lawyer is entitled to anonymity or confidentiality for any such
statement.
(C) A lawyer should exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other
persons assisting or associated in a matter from making an
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer is prohibited from
making.
(D) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency
with a lawyer subject to this rule shall make any statement
prohibited by this rule.
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If the invocation of Shield Law protection requires a
valid promise of confidentiality, this rule would insure that
lawyers who are participating in a case could not be protected
as sources, since the promise of confidentiality made to them
would be void and unenforceable. The Shield Law would no
longer "trump" a valid protective order. Lawyers would be
required to take public responsibility for any information
they released to the media about a case in which they were
participating. Other sources not governed by such a professional rule, however, would still be protected by the Shield
Law.
VII.

THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SIEVE

The most difficult source of leaks for courts to deal with
is investigative personnel of law enforcement agencies. In
the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson, reports of D.N.A. testing
results were appearing in newspapers before they had even
been delivered to the court or the lawyers. The leaks stopped
only after Judge Lance Ito ordered the laboratories to stop
sending the results to the Los Angeles Police Department and
to send them directly to him for distribution to the parties.1 1 °
In the Unabomber investigation, detailed descriptions of the
evidentiary items allegedly found by the F.B.I. in Theodore
Kaczynski's mountain cabin were leaked to the press within
days of the search.1 11
In the initial stages of an investigation, before charges
have been filed, courts have little or no control over investigative agencies. Protective orders ordinarily cannot be issued
before charges have been filed. A.B.A. Model Rule 3.6 recognizes this reality, by allowing lawyers to respond to adverse
publicity initiated by other sources. This may simply be an
invitation to a pissing contest with a skunk. Defense lawyers
110.

UELMEN,

supra note 76, at 71.

111. Neal R. Sonnett & Timothy B. Dyk, ProsecutorialLeaks, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1996, at 78-79. The use of anonymous leaks was particularly egregious with
respect to the results of the search. Id. U.S. Department of Justice guidelines
permit personnel, subject to specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or

order, to make public "[tihe circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest,
including.., a description of physical items seized at the time of arrest." U.S.
Department of Justice, Statements of Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv). The
search was pursuant to a warrant issued after the arrest. The guidelines require personnel who believe information beyond the guidelines should be released to request permission of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. Id. at 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(9).
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are often reluctant to seek a protective order from the court,
because it will impede their ability to respond to law enforcement leaks. Prosecutors throw up their hands in frustration,
claiming they have no control over the law enforcement agencies they work with.
Ultimately, this problem is simply another manifestation
of the lack of accountability of police agencies. The answer
lies in the movement to professionalize law enforcement.
There is no reason why law enforcement officers cannot be
subjected to professional rules of conduct the same way lawyers are. A commendable model already exists at the federal
level, with detailed regulations specifying what information
can and cannot be released by any employee of the Department of Justice.' 1 2 There is no reason why such regulations
cannot include a general proscription of any anonymous or
unattributed statements regarding a pending investigation.
The legitimate needs of law enforcement to communicate
information concerning a pending case to the public can be
met with public statements in which the source is identified.
A police officer or investigator is not entitled to any expectation of anonymity or confidentiality when it comes to a pending investigation. A promise of confidentiality made by a reporter should simply be unenforceable, and Shield Laws
should give no more protection to police officers than they
give to lawyers. Police officers and investigative personnel,
just like lawyers, are professionals who should be required to
accept personal responsibility for the information they release to the media.
VIII.

REFURBISHING TRADITIONAL TOOLS

One factor that is frequently overlooked in analyzing the
problems created by media coverage of current high-profile
trials is the procedural "reforms" that have undercut the effectiveness of the tools traditionally utilized to cope with massive publicity: voir dire questioning of jurors, challenges for
cause, change of venue, and sequestration. In a climate in
which media saturation coverage cannot be effectively controlled, the effective use of these traditional tools will carry
even more of the burden of ensuring the fairness of trials.
Yet the prevailing trend is to limit these devices to save time,
112. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1995).
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reduce expenses and protect the privacy and convenience of
jurors.
Effective voir dire questioning of jurors who have been
exposed to pretrial publicity can provide an informed judgment on the critical question of their ability to set aside
preconceived opinions and decide the case on the evidence
presented in court. This kind of questioning can rarely be
conducted by the judge, who may lack the familiarity that
counsel is likely to have with the nature and extent of media
coverage of a case. Yet in jurisdiction after jurisdiction, the
participation of counsel in voir dire questioning has been limited in recent years on the grounds that it is too time-consuming. Typical is the California provision, adopted by initiative,
which allows judges to conduct all voir dire questioning without participation by counsel.1 1 Limitations have also been
imposed upon public identification of jurors, even permitting
the jurors to remain anonymous in some cases. 114 And in
Mu'min v. Virginia, 1 5 a five-four majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that a trial judge is not even required to question jurors about the content of news reports
they have been exposed to.1 1 6 Although eight of twelve jurors
in a death penalty case admitted exposure to extensive pretrial publicity, the trial judge accepted an en masse assurance
individual
they could decide the case on the evidence without
11 7
inquiry into what they had read, seen or heard.
The frequent use of juror questionnaires has enhanced
the level of information available about prospective jurors in
advance. Counsel for the parties, however, are in the best position to process and utilize this information effectively in
voir dire questioning. While the use of jury consultants has
been widely criticized in high profile cases, the fact remains
that tracking of media coverage of the case and assessing its
potential impact upon prospective jurors who are exposed to
it requires expertise beyond the capacity of most lawyers and
judges. The efficient use of questionnaires and jury consul113. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 223 (West 1995) (enacted as part of Proposition
115 (1990)).
114. Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury
Tampering By Another Name?, CRIM. J., Fall 1994, at 14.
115. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
116. Id. at 431.
117. Id. at 415.
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tants can only enhance the efficiency of effective voir dire
questioning.
Ultimately, the acceptability of a juror depends upon the
credibility and persuasiveness of his claim that his fixed opinions can be disregarded and guilt or innocence judged impartially on the evidence. 1 ' Such a judgment cannot be based
upon perfunctory judicial questioning eliciting "yes or no"
answers.
A challenge for cause to excuse a juror must be granted
upon a showing of either implied or actual bias. In California, implied bias exists if a juror has an "unqualified opinion
or belief' on the merits of the action, based on knowledge of
the facts.1 19 Actual bias is defined as "the existence of a state
of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to
any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting
with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party." 2 ° Little uniformity exists in
how various trial judges interpret these broad provisions.
Many judges allow the potential jurors themselves to be the
final judges of their own bias, uncritically accepting a juror's
assurance that he can "set aside" a previous opinion and follow the court's instructions to decide the case on the evidence
presented in court. The availability of peremptory challenges
often functions as a "safety valve" even though a challenge for
cause has been denied, but serious efforts are now under way
to severely limit or eliminate the availability of peremptory
challenges. Thus, at a time when the risks of juror exposure
to pretrial publicity are accelerating, the risks that jurors
with preconceived opinions will be actually seated on juries is
also increasing.
While a change of venue may be an effective protective
device in the face of massive local publicity, today's mass media have wider geographic coverage than ever before. The
"media market" of a television station will frequently include
an entire state. Thus, a change of venue within a small state
may be relatively meaningless. But within the federal system, and even in some large states, a change of venue can
dramatically enhance the availability of jurors who have not
formed opinions about the case. Recently, the change of
118. Id.
119. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 229(e) (West 1995).
120. Id. § 225(b)(1)(c).
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venue of the Oklahoma City Bombing case to Denver, Colorado and the change of venue of the Richard Allen Davis case
from Sonoma County to Santa Clara County in California
were both supported by sophisticated surveys measuring
public opinion in both the community where the crime took
place and the community to which the trial was moved. This
is yet another example of the importance of jury consultants
and experts, who can enhance the effectiveness of the traditional change of venue to counter the effects of pretrial
publicity.
The sequestration of jurors has been greatly disparaged
because of its great expense and the burdens it imposes upon
jurors.12 1 Little attention has been given to the possibility of
reducing those expenses and relieving those burdens by modifying the terms and conditions of sequestration. Too often,
sequestration is perceived as imposing a requirement of absolute isolation. There may be effective ways for jurors to be
"sequestered" while still living at home, by imposing limitations on their access to news media and imposing a judicially
supervised regimen upon family members. If modern technology can devise a "V Chip" to prevent a child's exposure to
violent television programs, would it not be capable of devising an "OJ Chip" to prevent a juror's exposure to news about
a pending trial?
One of the most important resources available to assess
the effectiveness of traditional tools of selecting and maintaining impartial jurors is, of course, the jurors themselves.
Here, however, we discover the most serious problem of all, in
terms of the willingness of courts to enhance the effectiveness
of traditional tools. In state after state, provisions have been
enacted to seal information regarding the identity of jurors,
precluding legitimate research into the impact of media coverage upon juror's attitudes and perceptions. 122 Apparently,
courts have become concerned with the increased use of postverdict interviewing of jurors to support claims of juror misconduct during deliberations. The response has been to impose strict judicial controls over post-verdict access to jurors.
Often, such controls recognize no distinction between access
by advocates and access by legitimate researchers.
121. James P. Levine, The Impact of Sequestrationon Juries,79 JUDICATURE,
Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 266.
122. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 237(a)(2) (West 1995).
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What one jury researcher concluded about sequestration
is equally true about voir dire, challenges for cause and
changes of venue.
State legislatures have over the years grappled with the
issue of sequestration as they fashion and refashion their
rules of criminal procedure. Trial judges must determine
which cases warrant the drastic step of sequestration, and
appellate courts often have to decide whether verdicts
rendered in the absence of sequestration violated constitutional rights. Yet, these policy makers and legal authorities must act in an empirical vacuum, resting decisions on vague cogitations about the impact of trial
publicity and the nature of the deliberative process. This
situation needs correcting: we need to learn more about
how the jury actually12 3functions when it is quarantined
from the community.

Probably no issues of criminal justice policy are as little informed by empirical study as the issues related to jury selection and management. We are flying blind, and yet many
voices call for us to turn off the radar.
IX.

CONCLUSION

When we view the problems of media coverage of high
profile trials from an ethical perspective, we are challenged to
step beyond the interests of participants in the process to the
perspective of a broader public interest. We cannot effectively prevent the presentation of information about high profile cases to the public, or the formation of public opinion in
response to that information. We must recognize that potential jurors will be affected, and come to court with information and opinions.
Rather than making futile efforts to control the uncontrollable, we should focus our energy on goals that are readily
achievable: ascertainment of the information that presents a
clear and present danger to the fairness of trials; prompt and
clear protective orders limiting the release of such information; and strict enforcement of those orders when they are
violated.
Shield laws should not be permitted to frustrate the
achievement of these goals. Rules of professional conduct
should not focus on gagging trial participants, but upon re123. Levine, supra note 121, at 272.
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quiring them to assume personal responsibility for their
statements. A proposed model rule can achieve this goal for
the legal profession. While broadly expanding the situations
in which lawyers can communicate with the public about
pending cases, it would require them to identify themselves
when they do so. A journalist who promised confidentiality to
a lawyer who leaked information about a pending case would
be promising something to which the lawyer was legally
unentitled, and the promise would no longer be enforceable.
Similar rules should be propounded for the personnel of law
enforcement agencies.

